

Nation-Building in the Fragile States: Iraq After 2003 as a Model

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Abstract:

The nation-building process in fragile states is complex, often involving multifaceted challenges and opportunities. A pertinent example is Iraq post-2003, which serves as a model to study the intricacies of rebuilding a nation in the aftermath of conflict. During this period, we witnessed a significant international intervention aimed at establishing democratic governance, fostering economic development, and restoring social stability. Iraq's nation-building journey showcases both successes and shortcomings. Establishing a representative government marked a step towards inclusivity and political participation, yet sectarian tensions persisted, hindering cohesive national identity. Economic initiatives aimed to harness Iraq's oil resources for growth, but corruption and mismanagement posed obstacles. Moreover, building a unified social fabric proved arduous, as historical divisions necessitated reconciliation efforts.

The Iraqi model underscores the importance of a comprehensive approach encompassing political, economic, and social dimensions. Effective nation-building hinges on addressing the root causes of fragility, promoting institutional resilience, and fostering societal cohesion. International actors play a vital role through capacity-building, diplomacy, and aid coordination but must respect local agencies and avoid imposing top-down solutions.

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In this article, we address the problem of nation-building in fragile states by reviewing and analyzing the challenges that face this process and the opportunities available to overcome those challenges, with the selection of Iraq after 2003 as a model for the study.

Keywords: Fragile, Nation-building, States, Institutions, Challenges, Opportunities.

بناء الأمة في الدول الهشة: العراق بعد 2003 أنموذجاً

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المستخلص:

إن عملية بناء الأمة في الدول الهشة معقدة، وكثيراً ما تتطوي على تحديات وفرص متعددة الأوجه. ومن الأمثلة ذات الصلة العراق بعد عام 2003، الذي يعمل كنموذج لدراسة تعقيدات إعادة بناء الأمة في أعقاب الصراع. وخلال هذه الفترة، شهدنا تدخلاً دولياً كبيراً يهدف إلى إرساء الحكم الديمقراطي، وتعزيز التنمية الاقتصادية، واستعادة الاستقرار الاجتماعي. وتُظهر رحلة بناء الأمة في العراق النجاحات والنواقص. فقد شكل إنشاء حكومة تمثيلية خطوة نحو الشمولية والمشاركة السياسية، إلا أن التوترات الطائفية استمرت، مما أعاق الهوية الوطنية المتماسكة. وكانت المبادرات الاقتصادية تهدف إلى تسخير موارد النفط العراقية لتحقيق النمو، إلا أن الفساد وسوء الإدارة شكلا عقبات. وعلاوة على ذلك، أثبت بناء نسيج اجتماعي موحد أنه أمر شاق، حيث استلزمت الانقسامات التاريخية جهود المصالحة. ويؤكد النموذج العراقي على أهمية اتباع نهج شامل يشمل الأبعاد السياسية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية. ويعتمد بناء الأمة الفعال على معالجة الأسباب الجذرية للهشاشة، وتعزيز المرونة المؤسسية، وتعزيز التماسك

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المجتمعي. تلعب الجهات الفاعلة الدولية دوراً حيوياً من خلال بناء القدرات والدبلوماسية وتنسيق المساعدات، ولكن يتعين عليها احترام الوكالات المحلية وتجنب فرض الحلول من أعلى إلى أسفل. وفي هذه المقالة، نتناول مشكلة بناء الدولة في الدول الهشة من خلال مراجعة وتحليل التحديات التي تواجه هذه العملية والفرص المتاحة للتغلب على تلك التحديات، مع اختيار العراق بعد عام 2003 كنموذج للدراسة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: هشاشة، بناء الأمة، دول، مؤسسات، تحديات، فرص.

Introduction:

State formation has always been an exceedingly violent process. Most stable nations, characterized by stability, wealth, Western values, or democratic governance, emerged through intricate social mechanisms that included wars, ethnic cleansing, or even genocide. This violence was followed by institutionalizing the values and social preferences of the winners while also incorporating some level of compromise for the defeated, both within and beyond the new state's borders.

State formation has consistently involved brutal exclusion followed by practical inclusion. In present successful states, these processes have led to well-established political systems, with substantial internal consensus on their governance.

Today, according to some estimates, approximately a quarter of the global population and half of the world's impoverished individuals reside in areas commonly referred to as "fragile states." These regions are plagued by conflict, cycles of poverty, weak social cohesion, and often, patterns of violence and terrorism. However, these issues transcend the confines of fragile states. As routinely noted in discussions about state fragility, these places often generate perilous spill-over effects: regional tensions, global terrorism, cross-border organized crime, an inability to manage disease outbreaks, and other issues typically linked to "instability."

Nonetheless, fragile states do not fit the exact definition of stable ones. They evolved differently. Many underwent phases of tribal governance, warfare, and occasionally territorial consolidation, similar to European states. However, most endured colonization by distant powers or significant dominance by regional powers. In both scenarios, foreign forces imposed borders and manipulated local politics, elevating particular elites at the expense of populations that did not share the same tribal, ethnic, or national identity. When these foreign powers departed or reduced their influence, empowered elites clung to power or were ousted by their former constituents.

In this situation, nation-building in peaceful and acceptable ways is impossible because nation-building in stable countries can be achieved by strengthening the process of social cohesion among people through several means, especially (education, teaching a common language, improving infrastructure and levels of education, improving income levels, prohibition of racism, Etc.), but it can also be achieved in fragile states through use of force such as banning local cultures, or even genocide, and this does not achieve the desired stability in the medium or long term.

In this article, we try to address the problem of nation-building in fragile states by reviewing and analyzing the challenges that face this process and the opportunities available to overcome those challenges, with the selection of Iraq after 2003 as a model for the study.

The importance of the research: The importance of the research is that it addresses a vital and important topic that is characterized by dynamism, which is: nation building in fragile states. The aim of the research: to explain and analyze the real reasons that prevent nation building in fragile states, while studying the Iraqi case after 2003. Research problem: What are the challenges facing nation building in fragile states?. Research hypothesis: Fragile states cannot begin nation building without addressing the root causes of societal divisions.

Research methodology: The descriptive and historical method was used, in addition to the deductive method Research structure: The research consists of two main axes.

A-Definitions of Key Concepts

We need to define a number of important concepts related to the research subject, the most prominent of which are: nation building, state building, and the fragile state.

1. Nation-building:

Nation-building is a subjective concept, carrying diverse interpretations. The most recent perspective views nation-building programs as assisting dysfunctional, unstable, or "failed states" in developing governmental structures, civil societies, conflict resolution mechanisms, and economic support to enhance stability. This assumes a deliberate effort in constructing these nations (Mohammed 2007, 15).

Understanding the concept of nation-building requires grasping key terms like nation, national identity, nation-state, and nationalism. "Nation" has been defined by philosophers, scholars, and practitioners (Barkin and Cronin 1994, 112). Definitions range from essentialist, attributing specific characteristics as inherently national, to constructivist, emphasizing collective identification as vital to a nation's existence. A tension exists between those who consider modern nations a natural outcome of historical development and those who view national identity as a modern societal construction. While many nationalists adopt a primordial stance, scholars highlight ethnic origins. Modernization scholars and later strands of constructivists critique the primordialist perspective (Bertram 1995, 390).

Matthew Coon, National Chief of the Association of First Nations, referenced the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development's proposal of a Nation Building Model of Economic Development. The project defines nation-building as "equipping First Nations with the necessary institutional foundation to effectively assert self-governing powers for economic, social, and

cultural objectives." The model comprises four core elements (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991, 31):

- Authentic self-governance, allowing decisions on resource allocation and development strategies
- Establishing efficient governing bodies, incorporating unbiased dispute resolution mechanisms, and eradicating corruption.
- Ensuring cultural alignment to legitimize institutions in the eyes of citizens.
- Embracing a strategic outlook for long-term planning.

In 2003, a study for the RAND Corporation prepared by James Dobbins and others defined the concept of nation-building as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of conflict on a well-established basis for the transition to democracy" (Englebert and Tull 2008, 112). He compared seven historical cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. In all of these cases, the US military force intervened in them in the wake of the struggle for its democratization and the extension to other regions of the world since World War II, reviewing the lessons learned from these experiences. (Shakdam 2018, 9)

This definition of "nation-building" differs significantly from those seeing nation-building as expressing the "territory of a homogeneous nation." The definition concerns democracy-building processes, but many argue that using military force to bring democracy may be self-contradictory (Barkin and Cronin 1994, 107-130). If nation-building can be imposed from the outside is one of the main issues in this field, and can it be done militarily, is this question more urgent?

Also, looking at the conclusion of the study leads to the conclusion that the concept has been formulated and adapted to suit the current American approach to world domination in light of its strong unipolarity today, or it came as a result of an international political and military reality now (Shakdam 2018, 11).

Regardless of reviewing the experiences referred to in the previous lines as an example of nation-building imposed from the outside, we need to broaden the horizon of comparison to the issue of nation-building, as there are other models and mechanisms for nation-building, including “economic power” which reunited and built the German nation, for example. It also created another example that expanded the concept of the nation and added to it, such as the case of the "European Union" and other models. Also, the factor of external interference almost eliminated, or perhaps will destroy, the "Iraqi nation" model, for example (Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 56). The crisis of its instability and the disintegration of its unity looms on the horizon, with external interference, regardless of other internal rupture factors, the former regime's heavy legacy, or the regional neighbors' relationship with it. (Kreisi et al. 2004, 12-14)

Returning to historical stages not long ago, we find, mostly in traditional literature, a distinction between two types of divergent views, which prevailed in the nineteenth century and related to national integration, which may emerge as a line of dominant thought linked to the cultural and linguistic solution of minorities in (advanced cultures), and it is not only a historical determinism, but usefully indisputably for the minorities themselves. This process has often been considered assimilation, acculturation, or amalgamation rather than integration. Since there are no clear differences between these concepts, It is self-evident to say that there is no complete individual representation in the national culture, and the same can be said of integration into the wider society. (Brubaker 2009, 125-151)

This indicates a situation where a “minority” culture is represented or dissolved into a “majority” culture, which is different from the process of social integration, which requires rapprochement, assimilation, and willingness from both sides of the equation. (Connor 1972, 319-355)

The process of representation can be clearly expressed in John Stuart Mill's considerations of representative government.

Also, Acton was willing to use such expressions as a "cauldron of the situation" that causes a "fission" that takes its place through the enthusiasm, knowledge, and ability of one human sect, which may be transmitted to another. This means the desire, ability, and acceptance of a sect or social minority to integrate or assimilate into the culture of the more comprehensive society. Therefore, his arguments (Akten) about the hetero-cultural state lead us towards a surprising conclusion: Under the patronage of a superior nation, the members of the less advanced cultures of that nation would drop many of their outstanding features and learn a true (hegemonic) civilization, i.e., relinquish many traits of their culture, so how much of their distinct identities would be left. (Connor 2004, 35-47) Nevertheless Acten's vision of social inclusion was not far from that of John Stuart Mill, considered the most reliable advocate on the subject.

Experience proves that one nation can integrate and be absorbed by another. Furthermore, this assimilation and integration is more beneficial when it is already more backward and dependent on others concerning the human race. Moreover, no one here can suppose that it would be more advantageous for Breton, for example, or the Basque country of French Navarre, to be carried away in the stream of thoughts and feelings of very civilized and open people and to be members of the French nation, Recognized with full equal rights and privileges of French citizenship. (Shakdam 2018, 11)

Thus, we can diagnose two aspects or two aspects of the concept of nation-building. The first calls for external intervention to resolve the conflict with an external party, to quell internal conflicts, or to bring down a dictatorial government, establish democracy in that state, and reformulate the concepts of its unity and restoration based on a "coexisting and united nation." Artificially, they unite voluntarily. The second aspect is the process of integration, which

is carried out by peaceful means, usually voluntary, although there are plans and programs for its integration. In this regard, the focus is on an important and individual aspect: the abandonment of a certain minority of many of its cultural characteristics because it finds in it backwardness and learns the civilization and culture of the minority or the superior nation with which it coexists. This is how transformation and integration happen for that.

2. State-building:

The concept of the state-building process is traditional and modern at the same time. The traditional concept that prevailed in the post-World War II period until the end of the Cold War, which coincided with the wave of states' independence from the colonial yoke, was intended to establish stable institutions to achieve economic and social development. However, the concept of the state-building process, which was widely used after the Cold War, focused on rebuilding the failed state, which has become a source of threats to security, peace and stability in the world, as well as on issues of democracy, human rights, participation, and political and economic reform. Therefore, the United Nations and democratic states should pay attention to these states. And help them rebuild themselves by re-engineering these countries politically and socially, to enable them to achieve security, democracy, and internal stability. The state-building architecture that emerged after the Cold War accompanied the collapse of the state in several regions of the world, and its collapse entailed the emergence of dangers threatening international security. (Sghour 2008, 15-16)

Definitions of the state-building process have exhibited variability due to the interplay of its foundational elements and the contextual factors of time and place. However, a focus on key theoretical definitions highlighting the core principles of state-building is feasible. Francis Fukuyama's teleological concept underscores this perspective. He defines state-building as the process of fortifying existing institutions and erecting novel ones that possess efficacy, resilience, and self-sufficiency. This stands in contrast to

weakening or diminishing the state and its capacities. Fukuyama's conception signifies constructing state institutions and entities rooted in practical legal frameworks. These institutions are designed to execute the system's evolutionary functions, encompassing facets such as penetration, integration, loyalty, commitment, participation, and resource allocation. This process aims to bridge the gap between governing authorities and the governed populace, ultimately culminating in the attainment of political stability.

Charles Tilly states that state building: “is the process of establishing independent and distinct central organizations, which have the power to dominate over their territories, and have the power to dominate over semi-autonomous organizations.” The European Development Report 2009 also indicates that this process focuses on building the legitimacy of state institutions and their ability to provide basic services to its citizens: security, justice, and the rule of law as well as education and health that all meet the aspirations of citizens. Nevertheless, this ability remains relative and varies from one country to another, and even varies in the same country from one era to another. This is evident in the varying levels of states' capabilities to maintain security and achieve citizens' social and economic well-being. (Fukuyama 2004, 20)

According to the Overseas Development Institute, the state-building process is directed to the procedures negotiated by international and national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen state institutions. It is a term related to the effective political process of negotiating the mutual demands between the state and the citizen on the one hand and the nature of the relationship between the state and society on the other. (Jamil 2011, 8)

In the same context, the Foundation for Economic Cooperation and Development defines state-building as a self-enhancing process of strengthening the state's capabilities, institutions, and legitimacy through state-society relations. Hence, the issue of state building is subject to internal needs and external pressures. (Tilly 1985, 169-191)

The empirical historical perspective of the state-building process sees this process as a product of historical efforts to confront a series of critical problems, such as defense against external aggression, maintaining internal order, and providing food security. How these problems have been addressed has helped explain the differences between the political institutions of states and demonstrate that the state-building process tends to be a general process that requires a concentration of extractive, organizational, and distributive capacities, which requires the presence of authority and coercive power to extract resources and regulate behavior. (Sghour 2008, 16)

3. Fragile State:

A fragile state is a low-income state that suffers from weak capacities and/or legitimacy of governance, leaving its citizens vulnerable to a wide range of internal and external crises (Hassan 2005, 78). The problems of these countries are many, most notably weak infrastructure, human rights violations, endemic violence, the authoritarian performance of the government, and the widespread spread of corruption and crime. (Lamb 2015, 34)

It is estimated that between 35 and 50 countries in the world can be classified as fragile. These countries are characterized by a high vulnerability rate to disruption or paralysis in one or more devices. (Mohammed 2007, 21)

Since the causes of disruption or failure are usually permeated at the heart of the work mechanism of institutions, the latter are automatically disrupted. (Carment, Samy and Landry 2013, 125-151). Failures or malfunctions can be classified according to the following (Debiel and Lambach 2009, 22-28)

- On the economic level: stagnation and lack of justice.
- On the social level, there is a need for medical and educational services.
- On the political level, the authority is based on exclusionary alliances, blind fanaticism, ...etc.

The working mechanism of legitimate institutions in fragile states is exposed to the challenges of interests emerging from the womb of traditional authorities, or inherited from short-sighted ruling groups, warlords, or any holder of illegal authority. (Ghani & Lockhart 2008, 23)

States become fragile as a result of several circumstances, including but not limited to: (Ficek 2022, 45):

- The prevailing situation following crises, wars, or political transitions.
- The spread of government corruption.
- Development faltered.
- Prolonged crises.

It is worth noting that fragile states cannot be considered at the same level, but instead, they are distributed on levels or categories according to their circumstances and components, as follows: (Gabi, Mutebi and Putzel 2006, 45)

- *Failed state*: Here, we are talking about the highest levels of fragility, where the central government has no control over any of its facilities and institutions, warlords struggle to control land and wealth, and the people live in poverty and fear. Somalia, Libya, and South Sudan are the most prominent examples of failed states.
- *Failing state*: the state of states reeling under the weight of large-scale armed insurrection, a marked lack of legitimacy for governance, a deteriorating economic situation, and, most often, a massive internal displacement crisis. The Republic of Yemen is a good example of a backward country.
- *Weak state*: It is the state of states emerging from conflicts or crises that enjoy a great deal of stability, but their institutions are still not coherent, and trust between the parties to the previous conflict is missing. The governments of these countries depend mainly on the support of the international community, for example, Kosovo and Liberia, to name a few.

The damage caused by fragile states is not limited to their internal situation, as their problems and dangers quickly spread in the near

vicinity and, from it, expand farther, posing a severe threat to global security and stability in general and the surrounding and neighboring countries in particular. Perhaps the most prominent of these dangers are: (Kronenberg and Wimmer 2012, 176-230)

- Any armed conflict inside will gradually move to the outside, with consequences spreading throughout the region.
- The internal conflicts are causing a massive displacement and refugee crisis that weighs heavily on neighboring countries.
- Forming safe havens and incubating environments for international terrorism and international organized crimes.

On the other hand, the level of state fragility is closely related to the level of basic services that the government provides to its citizens, and the relationship is inverse, as the high level of basic services is paralleled by the decrease in the level of fragility, and vice versa. In this context, the provision of services is affected by several factors, most notably (Lemay-Herbert 2009, 21-45)

- Financial constraints, more than funding in most cases, are required to meet all requirements.
- Limited experience available.
- Lack of necessary information to determine the type and volume of services required.
- Targeted violence leads to systematically disintegrating the infrastructure necessary to provide services.
- The social system's fall leads to a high rate of social isolation and marginalization of certain groups.

The legitimacy of any authority is a judgment derived directly from its response to the requirements of all its citizens without exception and the satisfaction of their needs for services and public goods. In this way, the state-building process is an entry point for a state of security and stability. However, supporting this approach is complicated for several reasons, most notably (OECD 2009, 21)

- State building is a political process that takes a long time to become inclusive.

- Warlords are usually part of a political settlement.
- Political settlements are mainly based on power-sharing agreements.
- Those with de facto power refuse to be ignored categorically.

B- Nation building in Iraq after 2003:

The concept of the nation has been affected by many distortions in Iraq in particular and the Arab world in general, and the concept of (the nation) has taken its national dimension without taking its extent within the state and its components.

Consequently, this distortion or misunderstanding of the concept of the nation left its dimensions in the period after the collapse of totalitarian regimes and the beginning of the formation of the state on the foundations of law and citizenship (Wali 2019, 87), away from the exclusion and marginalization that was the prominent feature of the previous decades in which nationalism as a principle and thought was the one who governs and controls according to its vision and determines the paths and plans according to the goals, even if they conflict with the interests of the people. (Mitkes 1999, 136)

Perhaps the Iraqi case has been separated from other Arab countries by proposing this concept in the Iraqi constitution of 2005 (Mughamis and Abed Kadhim 2023, 176), and by it, we mean the concept of (the state and the nation). The subtraction process here had more political dimensions than cultural dimensions aimed at building a society according to the concept of the nation in the context of a single state. (Ogun and Aslan 2014, 14)

Therefore, the most critical components of the nation are the existence of (the state) in its concept known to all in terms of the historical link between (the people and the land) and (the nation and the state) and this historical context has more cultural and social dimensions than its political dimensions. We have the experience of Germany after World War II as a good example. Where (West and East Germany) emerged, and the eastern camp tried at that time to separate, but the historical context and, after half a century,

reunified the German nation in one state, which should have happened because it is the correct and required context. Thus, this confirms that the cultural dimensions are more potent than the political in uniting the nation and giving priority to its interests. In the countries of the world, we have experiences of coexistence within the framework of the nation-state, including but not limited to Switzerland and Belgium. (Alsayad 2018, 7)

Historically, the Iraqi nation-building project in Iraq began in 1958 after the fall of the monarchy. We noted when the constitution was written at that time and in the third item, which stipulated that Iraq was a common homeland between Arabs and Kurds, the Kurds showed their support and standing with the Iraqi state according to the principle of partnership and participation. (Al-Bakri 2011, 23) This leads us to the conclusion that the constitution in itself is the real guarantor of the activation of many concepts, including indeed the concept of (the state and the nation) and this guarantee strips everyone of their power to give them the power of the law and the constitution, i.e., strength (one nation in one state) (Hikmat 2019, 211). Thus, we found that the Kurds, for example, when they sensed the emergence of nationalist currents with an exclusionary approach to others, we find that they began a new stage of struggle whose leading cause lies in limiting the state to a specific group and nationalism without others. This situation was in Iraq and other regions such as southern Sudan or Kosovo, Even the Basque Country in Spain. (Shabib 2021)

After 2003, the political change that took place in Iraq - although it transferred the shape of the Iraqi state from the old concept to the modern one - was accompanied by many repercussions at the level of nation-building, whether those related to the emergence of democracy and terrorist challenges (Alwan and Majeed 2022, 211), or those related to internal challenges, the behavior of Iraqi political parties and forces, and the growth of armed groups (Ali, 2019). In light of this, we will try to show the problem of nation-building - internationalism in the Iraqi model after 2003:

1-Identity which is necessary for the nation, as it is considered the basis of the state's existence, its engine, and its symbol, as it is the national affiliation of the state, which goes beyond subsidiary loyalties so that the state becomes the national identity of all its members (Assafi and Aziz 2022, 234). The emergence of sub-identities or loyalties such as: sect, ethnicity, nationalism, religion, language, tribe, and clan (Hebert and Nay 2014, 199). Likewise, the failure of the state to preserve its identity will increase the state of political fluctuations and instability, and the state and society may enter into civil wars and permanent instability (Ali and Jabr 2022, 311). Preserving the state's identity is associated with the nation-building process, which supports national integration by establishing joint national institutions and symbols of unity. According to Almond, it is "The process by which individuals transfer their loyalty and association with local authorities so that loyalty becomes towards the central authority represented by the political system (Atwan 2013, 4). For Rostow; political modernization is linked to the term nationalism. In his opinion, the most important aspect of modernization is the development of national feeling and the emergence of the nation-state because political modernization includes changes in values, trends, systems, and structures to create an integrated political system and build a state of institutions. (Frank 1969, 41-47)

In light of this, we note that the Iraqi experience after 2003 failed miserably in preserving the identity of the state (internally and externally) as the new model began to deal with society and the state in the language of components (national, ethnic, religious, sectarian, as well as partisan) (Abd 2016, 64). This failure extended to the outside world (international and international) until we faced with a failed and paralyzed model. For example, we find the relationship between the center and the region, a distorted relationship that is not subject to rules, laws, or a constitution, and the widening gap and class disparity between Iraqi society, as well as racial and ethnic disparities and aversion to the cultural heritage

of the Iraqi state, Which led to the fading of the national concept of the state.

2-authority, which is necessary for the state. The nature of authority in Iraq after 2003 was and still is one of the most prominent problems in the nation-state-building process. Since the change and until now, the authority has not been based on respect for the law and the constitution and the application of justice, but rather a selective authority and weak, based on supporting the authority and influence of political parties and armed groups at the expense of the authority of the state and society. (Hassan 2012, 207).

All Iraqi political groups, especially those that held the prime minister ship, sought to build power without the state, and this matter created a massive crisis between the political system and society and led to the erosion of the Gradual legitimacy of the regime (Hikmat 2019, 115). This has generated significant societal repercussions, such as the invasion of Iraq by ISIS or the unprecedented growth of popular protest movements, and may soon lead to a rebellion of most classes of society against the political system more largely and broadly than before. (Vinograd and Omar, 2014)

3- Equality which is fundamental to modernity. The Iraqi democratic experience after 2003 did not honestly address the process of societal inequality, poverty, and inequality left by the previous political regime, nor did it place Iraqis on an equal footing before the law. However, on the contrary, it helped to increase the gap. The economic and political differences between the classes of society are vast, leading to unequal opportunities between them and the absence of equality in the application of the law. For example, we see a simple citizen being held accountable with the most severe penalties if he commits a simple violation, In contrast, we do not see that with the official or the partisan, or with Iraqis abroad in general, in addition to the class, social, and political disparity between Iraqis inside and outside, which negatively affected the nature and course of building the Iraqi state and keeping pace with the modern state project. Therefore, equality, power, and identity

are among the essential political foundations of the modern nation-state. (Atwan and Abdullah 2013, 5-6).

In addition, the problem of state-building in many failed or weak states lies in weak governance, administration, and organization and inadequacy of institutions at the nation-state level. Building the state needs to build society first and bridge the rift between the authority and society through sound human and political development, to strengthen existing institutions, and build new effective institutions capable of survival and self-sufficiency because the strength of the state lies in the strength of its institutional and administrative capabilities to design policies, enact regulations and laws and put them into practice, due to the power of the state is measured by the efficiency, effectiveness and ability of state institutions to perform their functions and the various objectives they undertake.

Conclusion:

Officially, what is currently in Iraq is a federal political system within the framework of an inclusive state, but what we see now is entirely different, as the state has been absent in one way or another, and the image of the Iraqi nation has disappeared with it, instead, the image of sub-national, regional, ethnic and racial identities emerged, to the extent that some began to fear the end of the mother state and the emergence of sub-states.

This stems from the short-sightedness of those in charge of political affairs, their need to understand the meaning of the state and the concept of federalism, and their absence of common denominators among the people. From here, society separates the state and gives it its identity. Thus, we see that the cultural pillar occupies a vital position in the structure of politics and the formation of the state. In this regard, there are several intellectual visions, each with justifications and arguments.

Some strongly believe that the beginning should be cultural to establish the state by building society first and then starting from this same structure in the processes of highlighting the phase of the

nation and the state, and this means that the state is not just a rule as much as it is an entity based on a group of ideas that fuse to reach a stage Intellectual and cultural integration to reflect the reality of the multinational society. However, it meets in one framework, which is the framework of the nation or what can be called the Iraqi nation in the Iraqi state. As mentioned, the term nation has been absent from political and cultural thought in Iraq for decades. This absence was accompanied by the predominance of secondary feelings that reached the point of hostility, disharmony, and fragmentation.

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