Alternative Perspectives in Explaining the Conduct of US Foreign Policy: A Historical-Critical View of Decision-Making Models

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Abstract

Objective: This paper investigates the contradictions in the decision-making process of the United States, which historically proven to be successful policies in the short term, but in the long term proven to be wanting and failure. Methodology: The paper uses descriptive, historical, comparative method. Also, the paper proposes four models to examine the decision-making process and how it differs in the short term and the long term. The models are: 1. Individual and rational model (Model I); 2. Organizational and groupthink model (Model II); 3. Governmental and bureaucratic model (Model III); 4. Communication and information model (Model IV). Results: the study shows that Models I and IV are among the major explanatory factors for the failure of the US decision-making process in the long term. Conclusion: the study
concludes that there is contradictions in the decision-making process of the United States in the long term versus the short term, the proposed four models, previously mentioned, show that Models I and IV that could speak to such contradiction and failure in the short term. However, synthesizing all of the models is critical in understanding and explaining the conduct of the US decision-making process.

**Keywords:**
decision-making process, decision-makers, United States, comparative chronological order, comparative politics in the US decision-making process, American politics, the role of communication and mass media in the decision-making process.
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Introduction
The foreign policy decision-making process (FPDMP) in the United States has fallen into a pattern that suggests decisions are implemented that are promising initially but prove to be failures long term. U.S. presidents from World War II to 2020 have faced outcomes that are external failures, for example, the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, the Iran Crisis, the Gulf Wars in 1990 and 2003, Israel in the Middle East, and the War on Terror. What factors help explain this failure?

This paper attempts to project Allison’s models, which have been used to explain only the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison, 1969). It proposes four causal models to understand the US FPDMP:

- Model I: Individual and Rational
- Model II: Organizational process and groupthink
- Model III: Governmental and bureaucratic
- Model IV: Communication and information

Research Problem
The United States’ decision-making process has been affecting countries worldwide. Yet the history of the US has proven to be promising in the short term but wanting in the long term. Examples of such decision-making outcomes are World War II and the use of nuclear weapons, the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, the Iran Crisis, the Gulf War in 1990, Israel in the Middle East, the Gulf War in 2003, and the War on Terror. All of these
decisions were promising in the short term but have been proven to be failures after implementation. The research problem that arises is, what can help explain the foreign policy decision-making process (FPDMP) in the US?

The Significance of the Study
This study builds on previous studies that analyzed the decision-making process and decision-makers’ outcomes, and how they are formulated and implemented. This paper will attempt to project Allison’s models (1969), which have been used to explain only the Cuban Missile Crisis, to generalize and explain the decision-making process more broadly. Also, the communication and information model (Model IV) is a key factor that has been added to elaborate on Alison’s models.

This study attempts to explain the short-term external decision-making outcomes that appear promising, versus the failure of long-term outcomes, in chronological order from Truman’s administration to Trump’s.

The Purpose of the Study
The main purpose of this study is to try to provide an adequate explanation for the failure of US foreign policy decision-making outcomes in the long term. To achieve this, we do the following:

1. Provide significant theoretical frameworks that propose an explanation for the research question.
2. Address significant variables that can best help explain the analysis of the phenomenon.
3. Project Allison’s models (1969) on the multiple political events of the US FPDMP to help explain the research phenomenon.
4. Apply the communication and information model to help understand its vital role in the decision-making process.

Research Question
The paper attempts to answer the following main question: What are the factors that help explain the failure of the US foreign
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policy decision-making process in the long term, from World War II to 2020.

In doing so, we will try to answer this main question via further questions:

1. What is the role of the individual and rational model (Model I) in explaining the US foreign policy decision-making process?
2. What is the role of the organizational process and the groupthink model (Model II) in explaining the US foreign policy decision-making process?
3. What is the role of the governmental and bureaucratic model (Model III) in explaining the US foreign policy decision-making process?
4. What is the role of the communication and information model (Model IV) in examining the previous three models in relation to the US foreign policy decision-making process?

Definitions and Concepts of the Study

Model I is a model used by Allison (1969) to identify the individual and rational actor, who tends to be the decision-maker. The model includes objectives, concept of threat, opportunity, state’s goals, and choice.

Model II is a model used by Allison (1969) to identify the organizational process. The model includes standard operating procedures (SOPs), capability, and constraint, and reflects on the groupthink model.

Model III is a model used by Allison (1969) to identify governmental process and bureaucratic procedures. This model includes players, perception, and preferred actions that influence each player.

Model IV is a model used to identify the influence of communication, information, and mass media over the decision-making process.
SOPs are the standard operating procedures (SOPs) when conducting decisions, which differ between organizations and governmental bodies.

FPDMP is an abbreviation for foreign policy decision-making process.

Habdaptive is the inter-relationship between habits and adaptation, or between people and the environment (Rosenau, 1990).

Islamophobia is fear, hatred, or prejudice against the Islamic religion or Muslims generally.

Rally-round-the-flag effect is the public support for the US president’s decision-making process in times of war and crisis (Rosati and Scott, 2007).

Methodology
This is a comparative, descriptive, and historical-critical case study.

1. The comparative approach is used to compare multiple causal models in explaining the research problem.
2. Describing the FPDMP throughout US history will give a better understanding of the problem.
3. The historical-critical method is used to account for all US FPDMP, from World War II to 2020.

Theoretical Perspective
I. Literature Review
In “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Allison (1969) discusses causal models to explain U.S. FPDMP in the Cuban Missile Crisis, which ended with a blockade rather than an airstrike, naval confrontation, or nuclear war. Allison asserts that Model I gives a better understanding of U.S. FPDMP in the Cuban case and highly criticizes Models II and III for their longitudinal procedures.

Allison and Halperin (1972) assert that U.S. FPDMP is a paradigm. The focus is on bureaucratic politics (Model III) rather than the rational model (Model I). They criticize Model I for
neglecting bureaucratic and organizational procedures and focusing on the state actor as one body in the decision-making process. Their study provides a scheme to explain the behavior of one government in response to another in times of crisis. U.S. FPDMP plans as follows: general perceptions of the threat, crisis or event; analyzing their interests; analyzing available information and their options; and implementing the decision.

Allison and Zelokow (1999) address different interpretations in analyzing U.S. FPDMP in the Cuban Missile Crisis. They conclude that each causal model provides significant reasoning behind the decision-making process, but none of them can provide a complete explanation. Model I is too simplified and neglects the other models’ premises (Allison and Halperin, 1972). Therefore, having multiple competing conceptual models is the best way to help understand U.S. FPDMP.

Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003) assert in The Logic of Political Survival that the role of rationality and the structure of the state affects political decisions. The core of the book’s argument is that the primary goal of all political leaders is survival. Thus, the decision-making processes that leaders use to identify a policy that ensures political survival is a critical component of policy decisions and political outcomes. In doing so, leaders also attempt to maximize their self-interest (political survival), while minimizing cost (Zuckerman, 2009, p. 77). Thus, political decisions are supported by the rationale that a leader’s belief system and perception will help them with political survival.

Rosati and Scott (2007) assert that U.S. FPDMP is dependent on Models I–III, which focus on rational, organizational, and governmental models. Although they have solid arguments for each, it is the rational model, focusing on the president and his group, which appears top of the paradigm. That is, they assert that Model I is the main component in understanding U.S. FPDMP, because of the president’s power over foreign policy.
Deutsch (1967) argues that communication and information (Model IV) is key in FPDMP, and that information is defined as “patterned distribution, or a pattern relationship between events” (p.274) The problem is that information tends to be missing, or in some cases distorted, and not always available, which affects the decision-making process. Selectivity, reception of information, and the measurement of information are key influencers on the decision-making process and actors. U.S. FPDMP has had multiple events where the information led to a poor understanding of the situation. For example, the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs incident were poorly articulated due to either too much or too narrow information, resulting in poor decision-making processes. Information is proven to be a core variable in FPDMP and understanding the decision maker’s role (Ripley, 1993).

Halperin and Clapp (2006) speak of the role beliefs and images have in the decision-making process, through the belief system of the decision maker. Likewise, Robinson and Majak (1967) discuss the role of the intellectual process of decision makers on decision making. This intellectual process includes intuition, creativity, problem-solving, and collecting and analyzing information, all of which help integration and consensus.

Previous literature provides significant input and understanding of the conduct of U.S. FPDMP, and each paper supports one of the four models, but few contemplate a comprehensive understanding of the decision-making process. This paper elaborates on the literature and the attempts to tackle the research problem using multiple models, not in one event, but in the chronological historical events of the United States.

II. Analytical Framework

There are multiple models and approaches that help explain the research question. The scope of this research and its analytical theoretical framework include the following models: the rational
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actor (Model I); the organizational process and groupthink model (Model II); governmental and bureaucratic process (Model III); and the communication and information model (Model IV).

The models are selected based on the following justifications:

• Explaining the decision-making process cannot be completed without focusing on the state’s actors and statesmen. Model I is a key variable when analyzing U.S. FPDMP considering the actor’s traits and interests (Allison, 1969).

• Model II and SOPs in the U.S. decision-making process is another vital factor. Political organizations in the United States are among the key structural bodies in the decision-making process (Allison and Halperin, 1972).

• Model III is crucial to understanding U.S. FPDMP. The relationship with the groupthink model in both Models I and III is significant when advisers and statesmen are considered (Janis, 1982).

• Model IV is a significant variable that requires attention, due to its influence on Models I–III (Charlesworth, 1967; Halperin and Calpp, 2006).

• Focusing on a single model is insufficient and misleading; synthesizing multiple models helps to provide a better understanding of the research problem.

A. The Model Assumptions and Premises

It is crucial to focus on the decision makers when explaining the U.S. decision-making process; there are multiple attempts by scholars in the field of Political Science to use this model. Allison’s models (1969) for explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis include the rational actor model. Allison’s “rational model” focuses on the role of the decision maker in examining choices and actions, based on that unit of analysis. This assumes that the actor should be rational and unitary, seeking to maximize interests.
and objectives in pursuing the national objective. In this context, one cannot exclude the realism tradition from this discussion. Realists, including Morgenthau, focus on the individual and try to link Model I to the nature of humans as power-seeking and fear driven Morgenthau (1973).

Although realists’ accounts dominate Political Science in the early 1950s, with the complication of the field, and added connections and actors, further elaboration is needed. Halperin and Clapp (2006) discuss the role of beliefs and images in the decision-making process, likewise, Robinson and Majak (1967) address the role of the intellectual process in decision making. This intellectual process includes intuition, creativity, problem-solving, and collecting and analyzing information. Simon (1985) discusses bounded and substantive rationality, suggesting that humans do not maximize utility, as realists believe, but satisfy them. Rosenau (1990) describes the inter-relationship between habits and adaptation, or between people and the environment, as “habdaptive.” This account is crucial because, although decision makers have the incentives and capabilities to affect the decision, they are restricted by the environment or the concept of opportunity (Most and Starr, 1989). Most and Starr’s idea of opportunity and willingness is another important contribution to this discussion. Although how opportunity affects decision makers has leverage in explaining decision making, willingness appears more crucial—at least in this discussion—in explaining the choices and actions of decision makers.

Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan in Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau (1956) discuss the role of decision units in shaping foreign policy behavior. At the individual level, they included the leader—“as a single individual has the power to make the choice and to stifle opposition”—(p.311) as one decision unit. They show that predominant leaders, such as Lincoln, have some
characteristics that bolster their role, for example, knowledge, orientation, and a personal view of how government should act. The individual and rational model is a cognitive model, as Ripley in Neack, et al. (1995) argues, in the way reasoning takes place among the decision units. The Logic of Political Survival, by Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003), fits in this model; for them, a leaders’ main purpose is to stay in power. Hence, the idiosyncratic preference and dominant belief system of the decision unit will shape the choices and actions of decision makers: for example, Truman in World War II; Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford in the Vietnam War; Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis; Carter and Reagan in the Iran Crisis; Bush Sr. in the Gulf War in 1990; Clinton in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the War on Terror; Bush Jr. and Obama in the War on Terror and Iraq; and Trump’s various international policies and fluctuating relationship with the Middle East and the Arab world. This model focuses on the individual and their role in affecting the outcome of decision; an individual’s perceptions is one of the explanations for a decision makers’ actions and choices (Allison and Halperin, 1972; Russett, Starr, and Kinsella, 2010).

B. The Projection of Model I on the US FPDMP
National security, the perception of threat, and the use of deterrents are among several factors that play a role in U.S. FPDMP. For instance, Truman’s decision to end WWII with the atomic bomb reflects his will and his conception of threat and national security. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought new doctrine and perceptions to Americans about whether national security required American forces to engage in a war against Japan and other nations. Eisenhower is another example, deploying American intervention in Vietnam to protect the South against the North Vietnamese government. Eisenhower’s doctrine was to face all threats conceived by the Soviet Union and its allies. This included Korea, China, and Vietnam. American
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intervention was never-ending and lasted for four consecutive administrations after Eisenhower’s.

From 1961 to 1977 the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations continued Eisenhower’s task. The Bay of Pigs (1961), where Kennedy’s administration attacked Cuba because of the Cuban Missile Crisis had an escalating effect; U.S. intervention, allied with the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front, to overthrow Castro and the nuclear alliance between the Soviet and Cuba, brought more tension to the crisis. This was all perceived as national security threat to Americans. Secretary of Defense McNamara, who played a major role in escalating U.S. intervention in Vietnam for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was the crucial statesman who initiated the idea of the blockade in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Johnson’s administration’s view on the Vietnam War was controversial. Johnson continued to use domino theory to minimize the Communist spread across nations but then began the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Vietnam, after consultation with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, due to negative calculations and the aftermath of U.S. intervention. Nixon’s administration continued with the intervention in Vietnam, but irresponsibly, attempting to widen its influence by launching an attack on Vietnam from Cambodia, without the consent of its government. This was a key action that caused the Americans to withdraw from Vietnam. Nixon pursued multiple irresponsible policies, ending with the Watergate scandal in Washington, which forced him to resign from office. Ford’s administration continued with policies against the Soviet Union and its alliances, with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. This period marked the end of U.S. intervention in Vietnam after the United States refused financial aid to South Vietnam, which had been promised by the Nixon administration.
U.S. FPDMP during the Carter and Reagan administrations (1977–1989) dealt with different international crises. Iran was a top priority at this time. Because of the alliance between the Shah of Iran and U.S. administrations, Iran suffered domestic opposition to the Shah and his rival relationships with the Iranian public and America. After multiple failed attempts by the Shah to maintain public support as its leader, the U.S. government helped him to go into exile in Egypt. Multiple tense crises between Iran and the United States—the Shah’s alliance with the Americans, the Islamic Revolution of Al Khomeini, and the American hostage crisis in Iran—shaped their relationship to be politicized and one of rivalry. U.S. FPDMP included engaging in the first Gulf War between Iraq and Iran; imposing economic sanctions on Iran; and the Iran Contra scandal, where Reagan’s administration sold arms to the Khomeini government, facilitated by the Contra (an anti-socialism and pro-U.S. a rebel group) in Nicaragua. This arms embargo was justified by the freeing of some of the American hostages held in Iran, which is considered to be a U.S. scandal.

Bush Sr.’s administration’s (1989–1993) alliance in the Middle East and the Gulf, specifically, was growing. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 influenced the formation of alliances and rivalries, and U.S. FPDMP, in supporting the liberation of Kuwait against Iraq, facilitated a respectful relationship between Kuwait and U.S. Bush Sr.’s decision making in launching the airstrike against Iraq was a unitary action, suggested and imposed by him, then implemented by the United States and the United Nations. To the Arab world and the international community, the U.S. intervention in the Gulf War of 1990 is justified as a defensive act, bringing pride to the reputation of the United States, unlike previous U.S. interventions.

The administrations of Clinton, Bush Jr. and Obama (1993–2017) set a different agenda in FPDMP. Clinton’s administration focused decision making had two trajectories in the Middle East:
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solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the War on Terror. Clinton proposed a peace resolution between Palestine and Israel in 2000 which failed, but he blamed Arafat for it. The War on Terror is another key policy of the Clinton administration, which was implemented with airstrikes against Afghanistan and Sudan, who were Afghanistan’s allies. There was a marginal intervention in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule because of chemical weapons production. Consequently, Bush Jr.’s and Obama’s administrations continued foreign policy toward the Middle East with the slogans “War on Terror” and “Peace Resolution.” In 2003, national security and dominance of the United States led to Bush Jr. invading Iraq, toppling Saddam’s regime. Obama’s administration continued U.S. intervention in Iraq and the Middle East but was forced to withdraw American troops due to massive losses in Iraq. Although Iraq might be a more compelling case for U.S. intervention, it is another Vietnam War, albeit under different circumstances.

Trump’s administration (2017–present) might be among the most chaotic in the history of the U.S. FPDMP has overridden both constitutional resolutions and international laws:

• Trump formed and set discriminatory international policies.
• Trump forced immigration laws internally and externally to “purify America”.
• There is a re-establishment of a rival relationship with Iran.
• He has exercised presidential power beyond its limits, causing his impeachment.
• Establishment of the domino theory and the use of deterrence have been exercised arbitrarily.

In summary, shaping policies in the name of national security and national interest is one way that leaders and presidents conduct U.S. FPDMP. Forming policies in the name of national security is significant in U.S. history. The Vietnam War, the attack on Iran, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Gulf War, the War on Terror, and
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the War in Iraq are all perfect examples of how a “national security” slogan will always get the “rally-round-the-flag effect”. Hence, leaders will implement decisions regardless of their long-term prospects, which has failed in all of the previous examples, with the exception of the Gulf War in 1990.

Organizational Process and Groupthink Model (Model II)

A. The Model Assumptions and Premises

In this model, Allison (1969) presents organizational process and its effect on the decision-making process, asserting that governmental behavior can be summarized thus: “action is chosen by a unitary, rational decision maker, centrally controlled, completely informed and values maximizing” (p.698). Hence, choices are viewed as organizational outputs—leaders can disrupt but cannot control the behavior of these organizations. Organizational behavior is focused on standard operational procedures (SOP), which set the opportunity and a menu of choice and restrict personnel from deviating from their interests or parochialism (Jones, 2017). Robinson and Majak (1967) include a model discussing this unit of analysis, named the “quasi-mechanical” model. In this model, they assume that decision makers are unconscious of their decision-making role. Whereas in Model I it is assumed that the decision unit is consciously and rationally making choices, in this model it is assumed that it is the organization, through SOPs, and not the idiosyncratic model that leads the decision-making process. Even under such an assumption, each individual is being idiosyncratic in their partial role of decision making.

Robinson and Majak in Charlesworth (1967) elaborates on this and discusses the rationality of the organizational process as “procedural scripts,” in which he assumes that organizations rely on institutional strategies and tactics for problem-solving, unlike in the rational model. Ripley, like Simon (1985), discusses “procedural rationality,” which is based on the assumptions of
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procedural strategies rather than substantive rationality (in Model I). Simon’s procedural rationality can be seen in the SOPs because the set of procedures in this model is based on organizational procedures, hence organizational procedural rationality is considered.

Allison and Zelokow (1999) discuss Model II by explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Under this model the government counts on multiple organizations—in this case the U.S. government relied on the functional role that several organizational bodies could deliver. For instance, the Air Force could not deliver the strike, whereas the Navy could organize it and create the blockade. Since Model II is based on SOPs, constraints, capabilities, and a list of options that could be delivered by an organizational body, the discussion of groupthink within these organizations is of relative importance.

In Model II, “groupthink syndrome” is of relative importance. Janis (1982) assumes that there are certain symptoms of groupthink that tend to influence U.S. FPDMP:

- Overestimation of the group: creates excessive optimism and encourages taking extreme risks. Unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality inclines members to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
- Close-minded group: there are collective efforts to rationalize the conduct of decision making before they commit themselves to their past policy decisions.
- Uniformity: involves reflecting on each member’s inclination to minimize doubts and counterarguments. It also includes considering the majority’s view to direct pressure on any members who deviate from the group’s stereotypes, commitment, and group loyalty.

These conditions increase the output and expect the decision making to be of lesser quality. Historically, groupthink syndrome
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has been evidenced on multiple occasions, as illustrated in section 2B. For Maoz (1981), dividing models into “rational” and “group decision” is beneficial in forming and discussing questions in each stage. But for him, combining the models is relatively important because synthesis between “rational” and “group decision” shows the impact of SOPs that constrain decision makers and reflect their impact on SOPs and organizational capabilities. That is, they are in a reciprocal relationship.

Russett, Starr, and Kinsella (2010) assert that Model II represents the unmonolithic nature of government and, through multiple organizations and SOPs, government tends to face difficulties and inflexibilities in acting, both internally and with other organizations. Russett, Starr, and Kinsella, like Maoz, share similar accounts of the relationship between the organization and its members. Decision makers tend to affect organizations, but simultaneously organizations affect members in how they think or how they should act, especially when considering SOPs. Most and Starr’s (1989) idea of opportunity and willingness helps explain Model II. The opportunity is, in essence, the SOPs that allow decision makers the chance to affect decisions, especially when considering the willingness of the decision unit.

The contributions of Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), and Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003), of political survival and the selectorate model is crucial in this discussion. In their models they suggest that, as in Model I, Model II faces the idea of “political survival,” but in this sense it means the survival of the organization and its financial and political health. The selectorate model fits well here, because most organizations do not include all people in their membership. Organizations tend to select their members based on shared images, loyalty, backgrounds, and interests in policies; this exclusion policy tends to correspond to the selectorate model. Destler (1972) discusses the role of the
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organization in decision making but, for him, there are four concepts of relative importance: the power of organizations (selectorate model); issues and flaws (shared images); constraints and channels (SOPs); and foreign policy as bureaucratic political outcomes. These will be considered in Model III.

B. The Projection of Model II on the US FPDMP

Organizational process and “groupthink syndrome” are among the critical factors that play a significant role in U.S. FPDMP. In Model II, SOPs, a menu of options, capability, and constraints play a major role in its conduct. Additionally, groupthink syndrome is crucial to understanding the projection of Model II and its failures. There are multiple instances of U.S. administrations failures as a result of groupthink—the Watergate scandal resulted from Nixon’s close groupthink, leading to his resignation, and Ford’s administration’s attack against Cambodia in 1975 is also considered a good example. The roles of Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld were significant in launching an attack in Vietnam. Although some consider it a failure, others do not because of its execution and victory. Furthermore, in 1980 Carter and his Secretary of State, Vance, tried using a military attack in Iran to rescue American hostages; this incident is considered a failure more than the Bay of Pigs. Reagan did not confer with Congress and the public regarding cutting some social security benefits to solve financial issues—a political blunder that did not solve the problem and caused unrest. In Bush Jr.’s administration, Condoleezza Rice failed to advise Bush on aspects of the decision of the War in Iraq in 2003 (Halberstam, 1969; Packer, 2005; Rosati and Scott, 2007). These examples of groupthink show that the closer presidents are to a certain group the more likely the quality of decisions will lean toward failure, because they tend to agree on almost everything and no one is advising otherwise. The dilemma stems from
presidents tending to hear what they like to hear, not what they need to hear.

In assessing groupthink syndrome one should note that although in some cases loyalty to the group takes over the critical judgment of issues, leading to failures, this is not always the case. Some decisions are less efficient because of other integrated factors: information, either limited or too much (see Model IV); screening by some officials and leaders; and the individuals who implement the decisions. Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan in Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau (1956) also discuss the role of a single group in affecting decisions. There are two types of single group as a decisional unit: the single group with a prompt consensus, and the single group in disagreement. In the first, Janis’s groupthink syndrome is apparent; the group should be small, loyal, and have one common source of information, thereby reaching integration and consensus. Additionally, shared images in the group, as Halperin and Clapp argue, tend to bring more consensus (Halperin and Clapp, 2006). In the second group, the intervention of a strong leader to overcome the deadlock is apparent (as with Vietnam).

Governmental and Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III)

A. The Model Assumptions and Premises

Although Allison’s (1969) Model III relates to governmental politics, the paper will also include bureaucratic politics of Allison and Halperin (1972) in the discussion, because bureaucratic politics is an important governmental body, and because of their complementary usefulness. Allison’s Model III focuses on the results or the outcome, such as decision-making and its implementation. In this model, it is important to consider bargaining and compromise as important features in governmental politics, especially when considering its multiple bodies “bureaucracy” (Jones, 2017).

Bargaining is a partisan mutual adjustment and an effective way of policymaking, which corresponds to Robinson and Majak in
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Charlesworth’s (1967) “social process.” Bargaining in social process or Model III is different than in groupthink, which is limited by time, deadline, and surprise or crisis. Here bargaining is more of a continual process between governmental coalitions and interest group interactions. Russett, Starr, and Kinsella (2010) show that Model III is an extension of Model II, to include Robinson and Majak’s social process.

Allison and Halperin (1972) combine Models II and III to form the bureaucratic politics model, where they discuss three important questions: Who plays? What determines the players’ stand? And how are the stands aggregated? In answering those questions it should be clear that this is the opposite of Model I. In bureaucratic politics there are multiple actors as players—and no unitary actor—who tend to focus on many diverse intra-national problems, not on a single strategic issue. These problems are aggregated by bargaining, not by rational choice. In this model there are multiple accounts for the outcome, action, action channel, decision, policy, and decision games, all of which are included in this decision-making process. Halperin and Clapp (2006) discuss the participants in the decision-making process, which include the president, senior participants, Congress, and individuals. They also address the presidential interest of expanding his interests and shared images while faced with domestic constraints like public opinion.

Destler (1972) defines bureaucratic politics as “process by which people inside government bargain with one another on complex public policy questions” (p.52). Taking his discussion from Model II, Destler discusses four themes, the last being foreign policy as a bureaucratic political outcome. For Destler, the outcome is not always “policy,” rather they are “grand decisions on grand alternatives” (p.65). Bureaucratic politics reflect internal dynamics of decision making which have two pitfalls: the danger of neglecting the broader national politics of foreign policymaking,
and the emphasis on bureaucratic motivation that blinds other interests.

Hermann, Hermann, and Hagan in Hermann, Kegley, and Rosenau (1956) also discuss bureaucratic politics by focusing on multiple autonomous groups as a decisional unit. This decisional unit perfectly illustrates Ripley’s bureaucratic constraints. In multiple autonomous groups, none can commit resources without the support of others: if one group blocks the other’s initiatives the outcome is hindered. Those groups can be divided into two: multiple autonomous groups with zero-sum relationships, and those with non-zero-sum relationships. In the former, leaders will discredit the opponent’s initiatives. The latter exists in the United States, where groups accept each other based on legitimacy and bargaining and negotiation among parties (autonomous groups) is an important tool for resolving divergence. Rosenau (1990) calls these decision makers “learners” and “constants,” where they aggregate their interests in a learning process through bargaining and negotiations to pursue their goals.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), and Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003) have an important role in discussing Models I–III, and the decision to include the expected utility (EU) model is due to its comprehensiveness. The EU model stresses different aspects of rationality, such as goals, calculations, expectations, strategy, and risk and uncertainty. However, an important caveat is that Bueno de Mesquita says it is irrational to be rational, hence rationality for him is essentially Simon’s (1985) type of rationality. The EU is like Simon’s bounded rationality in which bureaucratic politics takes place. Multiple actors in this political/governmental body need to consider EU calculations in which the decision-making process takes place. The concept of opportunity and willingness is also important in bureaucratic politics (Most and Starr, 1989). Opportunity in this sense is the governmental bureaucratic body and its regulations that represent
the menu of options for decision makers. The outcome depends on the willingness of decision makers in the aggregation and implementation of the choice they make from the menu.

Finally, Rosati and Scott (2007) discuss the role of a major governmental and bureaucratic body, the National Security Council (NSC). This is one of the most important bodies in the executive branch under the White House; it has a major role in conducting U.S. foreign policy. The National Security Advisor (NSA) is the most powerful person that the president depends on in the decision-making process, and their appointment is one of the most important tasks the president has when taking office. Thus, the NSC staff becomes the president’s own, because they serve the NSA, and the NSA serves the president; “the NSC was created to serve three principal functions: advise the president; act as a vehicle for long-range planning; and promote the coordination and integration of the national security process” (Rosati and Scott, 2007:117). The NSC’s role in U.S. FPDMP will be further discussed in section 3B.

3B. The Projection of Model III on the US FPDMP

Policy as a political outcome that results from compromises is one of the critical factors in U.S. FPDMP. In Model III who plays shapes each players’ perception and preferred course of action; what affects the choice and the “action channel” plays a major role in the conduct of U.S. FPDMP.

There have been several situations where perceptions of leaders and their colleagues have affected the decision-making process (Allison and Zelokow, 1999). For example, the Bay of Pigs incident shows how leaders remain key actors in implementation, despite colleagues and advisers being involved. For Allison (1969), governmental politics is not enough in accounting for the decision-making process; for him “individual’s priorities and self-interests are seen to the notion that there exists some single
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national interest, there is an array of organizations and therefore bureaucratic interests” (Russett, Starr, and Kinsella, 2010:175. Johnson’s administration during the Vietnam War is best explained through the lens of bureaucratic politics (Ripley in Neack, et al., 1995). Here, the decision-making process is dependent on players’ responsibilities and the traditional maxim “where you stand depends upon where you sit.” However, Ripley argues that ambiguity over bureaucratic roles, caused by bureaucratic constraints and personal roles, affects the efficacy of processing. For instance, constraints in information channels in particular affected the role of Johnson’s advisers during the Tet offensive in 1968, causing failure.

Presidents tend to lean toward the White House in conducting and formulating foreign policy, as the policymaking process is more centralized and its major bodies, such as the NSA, the NSC, its staff, and the informal personnel of the president, are close by. After the Vietnam War and Watergate, presidents faced constraints, such as the replacement of the State Department as the main adviser of the president with an active NSC, which became and took a major role in managing policy choices for presidents for implementation. The NSA and its staff play a key role in coordination and integration.

The creation of the NSC was to advise the president through a formal type of management. Although management style varies from one president to the next, the NSC is supposed to facilitate the formal networks between the president and representatives of different political bodies, for example, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. Some presidential management styles ignore those formal networks, such as Roosevelt and his reliance on an ad hoc and informal style. Rosati and Scott (2007) observe that “the expansion of U.S. armed
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forces, and the bureaucracy to support and implement the use of troops in both threats of the war, was so massive and so rapid that the policy process within the military became chaotic” (Rosati and Scott, 2007: 118). The lack of a formal management style can lead to chaos and the implementation of unreasonable and regrettable policies, for example the Vietnam War and “Vietnamization” implemented by Nixon, the Watergate scandal, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Although the NSC’s role is to advise and integrate the role of the president, the role of NSC tends to have been less active throughout history, and the projection of Model I is highly influential on the process of Model III. The president’s personality, beliefs, and way of management influence the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Since World War II the pattern of the NSC’s role and management has evolved. Johnson, for instance, preferred a “loyal and supportive” NSA, not a bright one like Nixon did. Johnson’s decision in the involvement of South Vietnam was upon the consensus of senior political figures and his closest advisers such as Clifford, McNamara, Rostow and Rusk.; he refused constraints, disagreements, and advice from his staff (Rosati and Scott, 2007: 123).

Nixon’s administration was held in the hand of Henry Kissinger—one person who had too much power; the policymaking process was heavily centralized because he controlled multiple statuses. Consider him as the NSA, Secretary of State and president’s chief negotiator (Rosati and Scott, 2007:118). This centralized policymaking overlapped too many jobs and marginalized all political bodies except for Kissinger, leading to chaos, shame, and the Watergate scandal.

The Bush Sr., Clinton, and Bush Jr. administrations had multiple management styles. “There are three types of foreign policy presidents or presidential management styles: a national security president, a foreign economic president, and a foreign policy
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novice” (Rosati and Scott, 2007:137). All three presidents depended on formal and informal management in different ways, that is, their management style tended to be ideological. Bush Sr. relied heavily on the White House and NSC-centric policy, leaving cabinet government out of the process. He also relied on an informal small group network in which much of the missions were accomplished. For example, the decision to engage in the Gulf War in 1990 was accomplished through informal small group meetings and implemented by the formal NSC body and staff. The dominant ideology in Bush Sr.’s situation was national interest. Geopolitics and U.S. relations in the Middle East was one dominant factor in involvement in the Gulf War. Iraq is an important country in the Middle East, but the Gulf Cooperation Countries were even more vital, especially when factoring oil into the analysis.

Clinton also relied on formal and informal networks, focussing more on domestic and economic issues and less on foreign policy. His unique management style and the establishment of National Economic Council had significant implications for public approval of his performance. Clinton is the only president in U.S. history to leave office with a higher public approval rating than when he entered (Rosati and Scott, 2007). In Clinton’s case, domestic policies and the economy were major ideologies.

Bush Jr. depended on formal and informal connections but also in more solid choices than the previous administrations. His advisers and staff were well chosen—Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice as NSA made a highly regarded, yet passive team. Bush Jr.’s decision to go to war in Iraq and have a military presence in Afghanistan was based on a lack of NSC advice, faked intelligence, and a lack of information, a decision failure that affected the administration of his successor, Obama.
To conclude, the role of the NSC can easily be manipulated. The president himself chooses the NSA—with whom they share common ground in beliefs and ideologies—so differences in opinions may not be apparent. In times of war and national emergency, the NSC tends to side with the president along with other political institutions and the public. In peace, the NSA reflects the president’s beliefs and preferences and does not advise him otherwise. And when the dominant ideology is national security, a defense strategy will be implemented in most administrations.

Communication and Information Model (Model IV)

A. The Model Assumptions and Premises

The communication and information model is important in supporting Models I–III in understanding U.S. FPDMP.

A(i) Information

Deutsch in Charlesworth (1967) defines information as “patterned distribution, or a patterned relationship between events” (p.274) and discusses important aspects of information and how each affects the decision-making process and decision makers. Deutsch says that the recipient of information could be identified at three levels—individual, organization, and group—that correspond to Allison and Halperin’s models. Screening, selectivity and bias is another aspect identifiable in examples such as the Reagan administration’s dealing with Russia. The information load is also important—both too much and limited information are detrimental to the decision-making process (Deutsch, 1967; Ripley, 1995). For example, the Bay of Pigs incident was a failure due to an overload of information. Additionally, the information channels that provide information for leaders must be considered. Roosevelt would pick multiple channels to investigate a single issue to validate the information and ensure its accuracy.

It is important to note that Models II and III are effective but conditional on excessive amounts of information—it is a critical...
factor in the success of their application. Allison (1969), Allison and Halperin (1972), and Allison and Zelokow (1999) discuss the role of information in their analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. They show that leaders, governmental bureaucracy and organizations screen information using their shared images and interests. In doing so they can distort information, creating an incomplete image with which to pursue their goals, usually leading to failures. The Bush administration’s War on Terror and War on Iraq had such outcomes and are perfect examples in which the leader distorted information and faked intelligence to pursue his goal in toppling the Saddam regime. Most and Starr (1989), Russett, Starr, and Kinsella (2010), and Starr (1994) examine the role of information on the decision-making process. They discuss the ideal information type as being necessary for Model I, where full information is needed to achieve the ideal action and choice, which tends to be impossible. They argue that information flow is not constant, but changeable at the individual and role level of analysis. Furthermore, they argue that accurate information is essential for all models, and inaccurate information may cause fiascos and failures. For example, in the Bay of Pigs incident they refer to different conceptions of the same information—that is, Kennedy received information about the overthrow of Castro in which he missed important signals which, if they had been taken into consideration, would not have led him and the United States to a failure decision. Information is both a blessing and a curse—it is needed to further the process of decision making, but when selectivity, bias and screening occur they can lead to a failure decision and sub-optimal outcomes.

A(ii) The Agenda-Setting

Agenda-setting describes a significant influence of the media—the ability to tell us which issues are important. As far back as 1922, newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann was concerned that the media had the power to present images to the public. McCombs et
al. (2014) investigated presidential campaigns in 1968, 1972, and 1976. In research conducted in 1968, they focused on two elements: awareness and information. Investigating the agenda-setting function of the mass media, they attempted to assess the relationship between what voters in one community said were important issues and the actual content of the media messages used during the campaign. They concluded that the mass media, represented by television, radio, and newspapers, exerted a significant influence on what voters considered to be the major issues of the campaign. Agenda-setting deals with the creation of public awareness and concern of salient issues by the news media. Two basic assumptions underlie most research on agenda-setting: the press and broadcast media do not reflect reality—information is filtered and shaped; and media concentration on a few issues and subjects leads the public to perceive those issues as more important.

Cohen (1963) noted that media tell you not only what to think about but also how to think about it; the press was significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful in telling its readers what to think, but it was successful in telling its readers what to think about. It follows from this discussion that the world looks different to different people, depending not only on their interests but also on the map that was drawn for them by the papers they read. “Perhaps the notion of a map was too confining, for it does not suggest the full range of the political phenomena that are conveyed by the press. It is, more properly, an atlas of places, personages, situations, and events; and to the extent that the press even discusses the ideas that men have for coping with the day’s ration of problems, it is an atlas of possibilities, alternatives, and choices” (p.13.)

B. The Projection of Model IV on the US FPDMP
B(i) The Agenda-Setting
Kim, et al. (2002) examined the agenda-setting function of the media in two ways: the exaggeration of media messages; and the events they want the audience to think about. They used content analysis to test the importance of particular issue characteristics in the media, and an opinion survey to test the importance of the same characteristics in the audience. The researchers concluded that media are capable of changing an audiences’ attention and directing them to think about specific issues and events in a particular way. Additionally, they asserted that the media, by emphasizing the importance of a specific issue, controls the audience’s perception of a certain event. Specifically, the media tell us what issues to think about, and often how to think about them; they also concluded that priming is a key factor in the decision-making process and belief-building in communities. In conclusion, media play an important role in indirectly shaping public opinion on myriad issues and events, most effectively in small communities with a limited choice of media outlets (Kim, et al., 2002).

According to McCombs, et al. (2014) the agenda-setting approach suggests that mass media have the ability to transfer the salience of items on their news agenda to the public agenda and a correlation between the media and public ordering of priorities. Most importantly, agenda-setting theory stresses the role of the agenda setters—major news editors or “gatekeepers,” politicians and their spin doctors, and public relations professionals—and the aggregation of interest on shaping the media messages, because they have full control or censorship of media content.

In his book Reel bad Arabs: How Hollywood vilifies a people, makes a thorough analysis of Hollywood movies from the early 1920s to the beginning of the 2000s. Shaheen (2001) concludes that media play a significant role in stereotyping, having the power to portray people, cultures, or nations in accordance with
the power of decision makers and attributes his findings to three reasons:

- Islamophobia, a result of the Iranian Revolution and the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
- The oil embargo during the 1970s, when the Middle East oil-producing countries boycotted exporting oil to countries that supported Israel policies.
- The Arab-Israeli conflict, starting in 1948 with the creation of the state of Israel.

Shaheen reviewed hundreds of movies that were demeaning to Arabs. In some of the earliest, Arabs were portrayed as savages who lived a primitive life. As the tensions between the United States and the Middle East grew, so too did the negative image of Arabs, which became more life-threatening as Hollywood represented them as terrorists and villains. In 2006, Shaheen produced a documentary that explained how the negative image of Arabs migrated from the movies to news content. In it, he referred to the agenda behind every editorial and production decision. He highlighted the biases in news footage and reporting, with a positive correlation between increased tension in U.S. foreign policies with the Middle East, and more negative images in the media. According to Shaheen, media frames reality and, therefore, we should look at the agenda behind every media message, whether political, social, or religious.

\[ B(ii) \] The Media Agenda Opposes the Political Agenda

There have been times when the media has attacked politicians, such as the Watergate scandal, when the Washington Post publicized documents that condemned President Nixon to the public. Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein were the journalists prominently involved in reporting the scandal between 1972 and 1976. Here, the media set the agenda for the public, which was
obviously to impeach the president. Consequently, President Nixon resigned from office in August 1974.

Similarly, the media played a large role in impeaching the president during the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal. Computer-mediated communication (CMC) played a significant role in the diffusion of details of the scandal. Williams and Delli Carpini (2000) described a fundamental change in the contemporary American media environment, where new media technology has eliminated the role of gatekeepers who would censor information before it reached a mass audience. In this era of the information superhighway and the evolution of multiple media outlets, information is now released without any censorship. For example, CNN released every detail of the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal to the public on their website and was subsequently criticized by the public because the content was not age-rated. There was huge pressure from the public on the U.S. government, which led to President Clinton’s impeachment.

The Vietnam War is another example of how the media can swim against the political current. The war lasted 19 years, spanning the presidential terms of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford. According to Hallin (1984), the role of the media changed during the war on Vietnam, shifting from objective support of U.S. foreign policy to critical opposition. Hallin attributed this shift to the raising of U.S. public awareness, as the media was vocal in emphasizing the great loss of life and the negative impact of the conflict on the economy.

B(iii) The Media Agenda Supports the Political Agenda

There are times when the media are united with politics, such as during the Cold War from 1947 to 1991. Lippmann (1947) introduced the concept of the Cold War, which was one of the outcomes of World War II and, in short, capitalism against communism. During that time, the media worked alongside the president to endorse capitalism. Bernhard (1999) asserted that
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during the Cold War, media industries were centralized and manipulated by the financial capitals in the United States. Since broadcasting requires large amounts of funding, centralization meant that the media was under the state control. Bastiansen et al. (2019) examined a collection from media outlets that exhibited how this struggle played out on screen, on radio and in print, from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, a time when breaking news stories such as Reagan’s “Star Wars” program and Gorbachev’s policy of Glasnost captured the world’s attention. The authors concluded that media in all forms was dedicated to creating negative images of communism: it was used as a mass weapon against any regime that promoted communism. Conversely, the Soviets used the same weapon against capitalism, but with less effect because of two factors: mass production to a mass audience, and exposure. The United States planned their messages and their target audience, internally and externally, and film industry output was not random—it was obvious that the United States was promoting that its efficiency in science and technology could surpass the Soviets’ science industry.

The Iran hostage crisis was a diplomatic standoff between the United States and Iran during Carter’s presidency. A group of Iranian college students, who belonged to the Muslim student followers of the Imam’s Line and supported the Iranian Revolution, took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran. They held 52 American diplomats and citizens hostage for more than a year and, following the crisis, Islamophobia escalated during Reagan’s presidential term (Shaheen, 2001). The media was dedicated to promoting negative stereotypes of Muslims in films and newscasts. According to Shaheen, most 1980s movies portrayed Muslims, particularly Arabs, as terrorists. Additionally, the Arab-Israeli conflict developed, further elevating the hate speech in the U.S. media.
With satellite technology, news coverage has changed drastically, becoming available 24/7, and focusing the attention of politicians on the importance of its role during crises. In 1991, during the first Gulf War crisis, the media—especially televised—acted in favor of President Bush Sr. Iyengar and Simon (1993) suggest that there were three types of media effects that operated on public opinion during the Persian Gulf crisis and war. First, according to the agenda-setting model, the media can control the public agenda by prioritizing an event and framing it as the most important, as in the case of the Gulf War. Here the media agenda manipulated the public agenda by prioritizing the Gulf crisis as the nation’s most important problem. Thus, the public agenda exactly matched the media’s. Second, census information from National Election Studies over three years showed the weight respondents accorded foreign policy performance when evaluating Bush Sr. significantly increased in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis. Third, content analysis of network coverage showed that military affairs constituted a larger segment of news, and survey data are linked to show that respondents reporting higher rates of exposure to television news expressed greater support for the military, as opposed to a diplomatic response to the crisis. It is suggested that these effects, combined with the nature of the media’s information sources, were conducive to legitimizing the administration’s position on the crisis.

Similarly, the War on Iraq in 2003 received similar attention and support from the media. President George W. Bush launched a war against terrorism by eliminating Saddam Hussain. Lewis and Rose (2002) examined media coverage of war powers for five months before the Persian Gulf War. Research has shown that the range of foreign policy debate reported in the media is a function of the range of debate in Washington, DC. Based on an analysis of ABC News, the New York Times, and presidential news conferences, they found that reporting on war powers—and, in
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particular, that congressional authorization is required before the use of military force—is linked to the dynamics of institutional debate in Washington.

The role of CMC as a new technology evolved during the War on Iraq. It was the voice of public agendas regarding multiple global events. The “global village” notion has changed the public drastically, from passive to active audiences; consequently they became less manipulated by media outlets and more aware of world events (McLuhan and Powers, 1989).

CMC technology provided the public with multiple information outlets and views about specific events all over the world (Hacker, et al., 2006). The presidential terms of Obama and Trump witnessed the widespread use of social media and publicly accessible information without traditional media outlets. Politicians and presidents can now connect with the public without holding press conferences as they would have previously. However, social media has changed audience attitudes, in that they have become more politically literate and, therefore, less susceptible to social media campaigns (Boulianne, 2015).

In conclusion, the media have played a vital role in formatting and shaping the role of internal and external U.S. political affairs—they played alongside U.S. politics but, conversely, against U.S. policies. The agenda-setting model illustrates the relationship between three agendas: media outlets, decision makers, and the public agendas (Kim et al., 2002). There were times when media agendas united with public agendas, as with presidents Nixon and Clinton, when the media revealed extensive information leading to their impeachment. The Vietnam War was another example of media and public unification, when the media shifted from the decision makers’ interests to the public interest and manipulated U.S. public opinion to pressure the government to stop the war (Hallin, 1984).
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There have been times when the media agenda united with the decision makers’ agenda, such as the Cold War and the Iran crises, when media outlets were the voice of U.S. foreign policy, and media messages were diffused to propagate the hegemony and power of the United States in the international arena (Bastiansen and Wareskjold, 2018; Shaheen, 2001). Additionally, with Gulf Wars I and II, the media agenda was united with the decision makers’ agenda to propagate war against terrorism, leading to the U.S. and international public approving the wars (Strömbäck and Dimitrova, 2006).

Nowadays the media role has changed; with social media the public has a greater opportunity to voice its opinion to a large audience, therefore the media is becoming more decentralized and the role of gatekeepers has diminished greatly (Hacker et al., 2006). A plethora of information is available to the public, who themselves become a source of information, enabling them to manipulate the agenda of the media and decision makers. Social media gave presidents Obama and Trump easy access to the public, or the “targeted audience,” enabling them to interact directly without a mediator and facilitating access to varied feedback on actions and events (Boulianne, 2015).

Discussion and Conclusions

Proposing different models to explain U.S. FPDMP tries to speak to the different accounts and mechanisms that would impact decision making and decision makers’ outcomes. In dealing with decisions on policies in general, and foreign policy in particular, the proposition cannot depend on one model only. It is believed that synthesizing and complementing Models I–IV will provide a better understanding of the conduct of U.S. FPDMP. In understanding U.S. foreign policy one should account for multiple issues on different levels—the idiosyncratic belief system that affects the leader; organizational SOPs and their roles in constraining the menu of choice; governmental bureaucracy and...
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agency that would also affect the opportunity for decision making; and the information flow and channels to and from leaders—in hindering or supporting the decision-making process.

Building on those conceptual models, it is proposed that “defining the issue/issue labeling” could help explain decision making and the failures of decision makers’ outcomes, which is significant in Model I. Many scholars show that shaping policies in the name of national security and national interest is one way that leaders and presidents influence the conduct of U.S. FPDMP (Allison, 1969; Allison and Halperin, 1972; Allison and Zelokow, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2003; Destler,1972; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2010; Halperin and Clapp, 2006; Janis, 1982; Maoz, 1981; Starr, 1994; and Russett, Starr, and Kinsella, 2010.) Although some of the arguments appear compelling in explaining U.S. FPDMP, the failure of such FPDMP is significant. The United States has been sabotaging its image externally, and since Vietnam, U.S. leaders have been disappointing their public with decisions that apparently work in the short term but are proven failures in the long term.

Recommendations and Future Research

1. Further investigation is needed to analyze public opinion and its influence over U.S. FPDMP.
2. Future researchers should attempt aggregating quantitative studies and public opinion studies to analyze U.S. FPDMP.
3. Implementing the explanatory models to help understand other states’ foreign policy to account for generalizability.

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